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I. Introduction
Imagine a budding entrepreneur, Norville Rogers, who lives in a state that recently
legalized recreational cannabis. Mr. Rogers wants to start a dispensary and meets all of his
state’s requirements for a new dispensary. He just needs enough startup capital.
Mr. Rogers knows it can cost between $250,000 and $750,000 just to get a new
dispensary off the ground, and that he needs more cash on hand to keep up inventory.1 This task
should be easy. He will just go to the bank he uses for his other ventures, obtain a loan, and set
up a business account from which to run the business. When Mr. Rogers meets with the bank,
however, he learns it will not deal with him because of the risks associated with instigating a
federal money laundering indictment by choosing to deal with cannabis-related businesses
(“Cannabusinesses”). Mr. Rogers must either abandon his dreams of becoming a dispensary
owner or find a way to procure almost three quarters of a million dollars and run a business
without using banks.
Social equity is an oft-cited justification for cannabis legalization in states like New
Jersey. Such legalization states have specific departments within their respective regulatory
bodies aimed at furthering social equity goals by “establishing practices and procedures for
promoting inclusion of diverse populations” in the cannabis industry. 2 These social equity goals,
however, are all for naught when federal prohibition renders running a legitimate cannabisrelated business (“Cannabusiness”) incredibly difficult, if not nearly impossible, without
independent wealth. While there is no federal law that explicitly forbids banks from doing

See Gary Cohen, Member Blog: How Much Does it Actually Cost to Open a Dispensary, NAT’L CANNABIS I NDUS.
ASS’N (Sept. 25, 2018), https://thecannabisindustry.org/member-blog-how-much-does-it-actually-cost-to-open-adispensary/#:~:text=And%20while%20there%20are%20many,in%20the%20most%20saturated%20markets .
2 See What is the role of the Minority, Disabled Veteran, and Women Cannabis Development Office? ,, N.J. Cannabis
Reg. Comm’n, https://www.nj.gov/cannabis/resources/faqs/social-equity/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
1
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business with Cannabusinesses, most banks avoid Cannabusinesses because of the unique risk
the pose due to federal prohibition.3 As a result, Cannabusinesses generally operate unbanked
and cash-only.
Businesses operating cash-only have unique problems. Cash-only businesses are robbery
targets. It is well-known that Cannabusinesses operate only in cash.4 Cannabusinesses like
BASA in San Francisco report repeated robberies, sometimes even multiple nights in a row,
because they are “high-risk” businesses with ample cash on hand. 5 Crime is just one example of
“shrinkage” wherein cash becomes unusable over time due to theft: mold, pests, misplacement,
and other ill effects brought on by storing large volumes of cash for extended periods all serve to
add extra expense to cash-only businesses. Budding Cannabusiness owners and operators must
handle these large volumes of cash and account for shrinkage to operate successfully.
Federal prohibition presents additional tax barriers to operating Cannabusinesses.
Cannabusinesses must pay taxes and fees in cash every month, so if the payment offices are
closed – maybe due to a public health emergency – Cannabusinesses cannot pay their taxes and
fees and may end up losing their licenses.6 These barriers all prevent those without the financial
means from opening and operating Cannabusinesses and introduce unnecessary risk to those with
the financial means to operate them, ultimately stifling industry growth and preventing social
equity programs through Cannabusiness.

3

Eric Kaufman, The Challenges of Running a Legitimate Cannabis Business out of a Duffel Bag Filled With Cash ,
Forbes Business Development Counsel (October 19, 2020), ¶2
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinessdevelopmentcouncil/2020/10/19/the -challenges-of-running-alegitimate-cannabis-business-out-of-a-duffel-bag-filled-with-cash/?sh=59317f9512b4,at ¶2.
4 Id. ¶ 3.
5 Chris Roberts, Legal Cannabis Businesses are Preparing to get Robbed Again. Will Police Protect Marijuana
Legalization? FORBES (Jul. 2, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisroberts/2020/07/02/legal-cannabisbusinesses-are-preparing-to-get-robbed-again-will-police-protect-marijuana -legalization/?sh=67bf59d81009.
6 Kaufman, supra note 3, at ¶ 5.
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Part II of this paper provides a brief overview of federal cannabis policy since the
enactment of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). In recent decades, states have begun
legalizing cannabis to different degrees, despite federal prohibition. Since 2009, federal
regulators have issued memoranda regarding federal enforcement of cannabis prohibition in
legalization states. Part II briefly outlines those memoranda and their effects on Cannabusinesses
and the cannabis market.
Part III examines the negative effects of federal regulation on Cannabusinesses, including
increased risk of victimization, chilled investment, and lack of banking options. Part III also
examines the burdens on Cannabusinesses caused by their largely cash-only status.
Part IV explores possible remedies to cannabis prohibition and its ill-effects. First, it
explores the possibility of a new Department of Justice (“DOJ”) memorandum that halts federal
prohibition enforcement and grants amnesty to banking institutions. It then examines pending
federal legislation aimed at remedy prohibition-related harms, including the Secure and Fair
Enforcement Banking Act of 2021 (“SAFE Banking Act”), the Strengthening the Tenth
Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, and the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and
Expungement Act (“MORE Act”). The MORE Act has gained the most traction, passing the
United States House of Representatives (“House”) on April 1, 2022, but it does not adequately
address the concerns expressed in this paper because it fails to offer proper federal oversight.
Part V offers two policy recommendations aimed at enabling the federal government to
better address state legalization and the risks associated with legalizing cannabis without
adopting a more robust federal regulatory scheme. The first solution consists of amendments to
proposed federal legislation that would reduce or eliminate the ill-effects of the CSA on
Cannabusinesses and personal users in the United States. It also includes recommendations for
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how federal regulators should approach standardizing the cannabis industry to ensure
consistency across the market. The second solution proposes enactment of the MORE Act with
amendments or, in the event the MORE Act passes unaltered, subsequent federal legislation to
supplement the MORE Act’s provisions.

II. Federal Cannabis Policy Post-CSA
The Controlled Substances Act
Before the Nixon administration initiated the “War on Drugs,” there existed no official
federal prohibition on cannabis use.7 Prior administrations attempted to curb drug distribution
and use through taxation and labeling regulations enforced by the Department of the Treasury.8
Cannabis first became the target of federal regulation in 1937 with the passage of the Marihuana
Tax Act which did not outlaw the possession, sale, or use of cannabis. Instead, it imposed
registration, reporting, and taxation requirements on individuals who imported, produced, or sold
cannabis.9 Noncompliance with those requirements exposed those parties to severe federal
penalties, while compliance often subjected them to prosecution under state law. 10
In response to the “War on Drugs,” Congress enacted Title II of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, otherwise known as the Controlled Substances Act
(“CSA”).11 The CSA radically changed the federal drug regulatory scheme by establishing five

7

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See, e.g., The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970) (requiring producers, distributors,
and purchasers of narcotics to register with the Federal Government, assessing taxes against registered parties, and
regulating issuances of prescriptions).
9 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 553, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937)(repealed 1970).
10 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16, (1969) (stating that, if read according to its terms, the Marihuana Tax Act
forced the petitioner to expose himself to self-incrimination by requiring him to identify himself as a transferee o f
marijuana with the Federal Government thus subjecting himself to sta te action for failure to pay state occupational
tax; thus holding the Marihuana Tax Act was unconstitutional on self -incrimination grounds).
11 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
8
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“schedules” of controlled substances. These schedules vary in how strictly the government
regulates their respective controlled substances, with schedule I ranked most strictly and
Schedule V least strictly12 Congress delegated to the United States Attorney General the
authority to add or remove controlled substances to or from the schedules, though Congress may
still add or remove drugs from the schedule by legislation.13 Furthermore, the CSA explicitly
classified “marihuana” and “Tetrahydrocannabinols, except for tetrahydrocannabinols in hemp”
by name as Schedule I controlled substances, where they remain today.14 A Schedule I controlled
substance is one which (1) has a high potential for abuse, (2) has no currently accepted medical
use in in treatment in the United States, and (3) lacks accepted safety for use under medical
supervision.15

The Ogden Memo
In response to states’ growing medical marijuana programs, then-Deputy Attorney
General David Ogden issued a policy memorandum (“Ogden Memo”) on October 19, 2009 to
resolve tensions between state legalization and ongoing federal prohibition.16
The Ogden Memo, which was directed at federal prosecutors in states that had legalized
medical cannabis, provided uniform guidance on how to focus federal cannabis investigations
and prosecutions in those states.17 The Memo stated that, as a general matter, disruption of illegal
drug manufacturing and trafficking networks should not be a federal priority with regard to

12

Id. § 812.
Id. § 811.
14 Id. § 812(c)(I)(c)(10) & (17) (listing “Marihuana” as a Schedule I controlled substance with “no currently
accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse”).
15 Id.
16 Joëlle Anne Moreno, Half-Baked: The Science and Politics of Legal Pot, 123 PENN ST. L. R EV. 401, 453 (2019).
17 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. David W. Ogden, to Selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum -selected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-andprosecutions-states [hereinafter Ogden Memo].
13
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individuals whose actions are in “clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”18 It made clear that the federal government would
not waste resources on individuals using cannabis as medicine so long as that use was compliant
with applicable state law.19 Individuals were not deemed in “clear and unambiguous compliance
with state laws” if certain characteristics accompanied cannabis use including unlawful
possession of firearms; violence; sale to minors; illegal possession of other controlled
substances; or ties to other criminal enterprises. 20 The Ogden Memo was extremely limited in its
scope, explicitly stating that the slightest deviation from state medical cannabis policy was
grounds to initiate a federal investigation and that the memo was not intended to either “legalize”
marijuana or provide a legal defense to any violation of federal law.21
The Cole Memo
On August 29, 2013, then-Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued an internal
DOJ memorandum (“Cole Memo”), which provided updated guidance to federal prosecutors
concerning “marijuana enforcement under the Controlled Substances Act.” 22 The Cole Memo
outlined eight priorities, commonly referred to as the “Eight Deadly Sins,” to guide federal
prosecutors’ CSA enforcement of cannabis-related conduct.23 The “Eight Deadly Sins” include,
(1) preventing distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing revenue from the sale of
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises; (3) preventing diversion of marijuana from states

18

Ogden Memo, supra note 17, at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. James M. Cole, to U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter Cole Memo].
23 Id.
19
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where it is legal under state law in some form; and (4) preventing marijuana possession on
federal property, among others.24
The Cole Memo further noted that the federal government traditionally relied on state and
local law enforcement to address marijuana activity by enforcing their own cannabis laws.25
Such enforcement includes “[t]he enactment of state laws that endeavor to authorize marijuana
production, distribution, and possession by establishing a regulatory scheme for these
purposes.”26 The Cole Memo makes the point that legalization states that enact strong and
effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with state law are unlikely to run afoul
of any of the “Eight Deadly Sins.”27
The Cole Memo directed federal prosecutors to “weigh all available information and
evidence, including . . . whether the operation is demonstrably in compliance with a strong and
effective state regulatory system” when determining if a cannabis operation implicated one of the
“Eight Deadly Sins.”28 In other words, the Cole Memo did not alter the federal government’s
authority to enforce federal law, but announced that federal prosecutors should not waste
valuable law enforcement resources enforcing federal cannabis laws against actors compliant
with state law.29

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Memo

24

Id.
Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Steven Mare, He Who Comes Into Court Must Not Come With Green Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing
Struggle With The Illegality And Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 H OFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2016) (stating that the
Cole Memo “stressed state regulation of the marijuana industry instead of federal government interference”).
25
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Federal law expects financial institutions to discover and report illegal activity and
prevent wrongdoers from accessing the banking system.30 The Money Laundering Control Act,31
for example, subjects individuals and entities to criminal liability for money laundering. With
regard to cannabusiness banking, a banking institution may commit money laundering by
conducting a financial transaction involving the proceeds of a known unlawful activity while
knowing the transaction is “designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
or to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state law.” 32 A financial institution may
also commit money laundering where the institution “knowingly engages or attempts to engage
in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000.” 33 The
“manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance,” including cannabis, is
a ”specified unlawful activity” under the Money Laundering Control Act. 34
Additionally, federal statutes such as the Bank Secrecy Act 35 require financial
institutions to maintain programs designed to prevent money laundering. 36 The Bank Secrecy
Act broadly defines “financial institutions” to apply to all insured banks; private bankers; all
credit unions; loan or finance companies; and other entities that may facilitate money
laundering.37 These financial institutions must make reasonable efforts to verify the identity of
those seeking to open an account, regardless of if that entity is a person or business. 38

30

Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 597, 610 (2015).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2012).
32 Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B).
33 Id. § 1957(a).
34 Id. §§ 1956(c)(7), 1957(f)(3);
35 Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
36 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(h) (2012).
37 See Id. § 5312.
38 Id. § 5318(l)
31
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On February 14, 2014, nearly six months after issuance of the Cole Memo, the
Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) released its
own memo (“FinCEN Memo”) to provide additional guidance to financial institutions regarding
Cannabusinesses.39 The FinCEN Memo clarified how financial institutions could provide
services to Cannabusinesses consistent with their Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) obligations.40 In
general, the FinCEN Memo advised financial institutions to consider whether the
Cannabusinesses with which they conducted business implicated one of the “Eight Deadly Sins”
or violated state law.41 FinCEN explicitly stated that it agreed with the Cole Memo guidance and
that it encouraged financial institutions to perform “customer due diligence” based on a series of
factors to assess the risks of providing financial services to Cannabusinesses.42 To perform their
“due diligence,” under the Bank Secrecy Act and the FinCEN Memo, institutions must file
currency transaction reports for any transaction involving more than $10,000 in cash. 43
The FinCEN Memo also reminded institutions that provide services to Cannabusinesses
of their obligation to file a suspicious activity report (“SAR”) to the federal government given
that the business activities at issue were illegal under federal law.44 There are three categories of

39

Brad Scheick, Do You Feel Lucky, Banker? The Shaky Prospects for Financial Transactions with Marijuana Related Businesses, Miller & Starr, Real Estate News Alert, 459, 464 May 2018.
40 Fin. Crimes Enf't Network, Fin-2014-G001, BSA Expectations Regarding Ma rijuana -Related Business (2014),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-G001.pdf (Financial institutions that conduct
transactions with money generated by Cannabusinesses could face liability under the BSA for failing to identify or
report financial transactions involving proceeds generated by cannabis-related violations of the CSA. For these
purposes, prosecution of these offenses does not require an underlying cannabis-related conviction).
41 FinCEN Memo, supra note 40, at 1-2.
42 Id. at 2-3 (explain that the factors include (1) verifying with state authorities whether the business is duly licensed
and registered; (2) reviewing the license application submitted by the business for obtaining a state license to
operate; (3) requesting from state licensing and enforcement authorities available information about the business and
related parties; (4) developing an understanding of the normal and expected activity for the business; (5) ongoing
monitoring of publicly available sources for a dverse information about the business and related parties; (6) ongoing
monitoring for suspicious activity, including any red flags described in this guidance; and (7) refreshing information
obtained as part of customer due diligence on a periodic basis and commensurate with risk).
43 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2014).
44 Id. Because Cannabusinesses are federally illegal, funds from those businesses are derived from activity that is
illegal under federal law. Therefore, any funds from Cannabusinesses must be reported in a SAR by financial
institutions which choose to transact with a cannabusiness.
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SAR depending on the nature of the “suspicious activity”: (1) “Marijuana Limited” for
businesses which do not implicate the “Eight Deadly Sins” or violate state law; (2) “Marijuana
Priority” for businesses reasonably believed to implicate one of the “Eight Deadly Sins” or
violate state law; and (3) “Marijuana Termination” for instances where a financial institution
deems it necessary to terminate a relationship with a business to maintain an effective antimoney laundering compliance program.45 The FinCEN Memo guidance created a narrow window
for banking institutions to transact with Cannabusinesses without exposing themselves to federal
enforcement of money laundering statutes. There is little financial incentive, however, for
banking institutions to try to navigate the strict provisions laid out in the FinCEN memo. Any
accidental lapse or deviation from that guidance could result in harsh federal criminal penalties
and could cause the financial institution to lose its federal charter. As a result, virtually all large
national banks have opted not to offer their services to the cannabis industry. 46
The Sessions Recission
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Ogden Memo, Cole Memo, and other
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) memos regarding loosening of cannabis-related prosecution on
January 4, 2018, three days after California became the eighth state to legalize recreational
cannabis use, via a one-page “Memorandum for All United States Attorneys” (“Sessions
Memo”).47 The Sessions Memo reminded United States attorneys that the CSA generally
prohibits the cultivation, distribution, and possession of cannabis and that those activities may
serve as the basis for prosecution of other crimes such as those prohibited by money laundering

45

Id. at 3-4.
Scheick, supra note 39, at 465.
47 See Laura Jarrett, Sessions nixes Obama-era rules leaving states alone that legalize pot, CNN (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2lv5Ton.; Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, to U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [hereinafter Sessions Memo].
46
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statutes and the BSA.48 While the Sessions Memo suggested that state cannabis legislation would
no longer be permitted, prosecution of state-compliant cannabis activity has remained
uncommon, inconsistent, and unclear.49 The Sessions Memo did not rescind the FinCEN Memo,
which remains in effect.

III. Effects of Deficient Federal Guidance on Cannabusiness and Crime
Cannabusinesses are at Higher Risk of Victimization
Federal prohibition prompts most banks to refuse to transact with cannabis growers,
extractors, distributors, and sellers – even those that operate legally in their own states.50 As a
result, Cannabusinesses must operate on a cash-only basis with large volumes of currency,
rendering them easy targets for robberies, kidnappings, and extortion.51
Even prior to the release of the Sessions Memo, banking institutions were hesitant to deal
with Cannabusinesses given the tentative legal landscape, lack of federal legalization, and
roadblocks posed by the FinCEN Memo. Following the Sessions Memo, which indicated that the
Department of Justice might prosecute even actors in compliance with state law, the banking
landscape is only more uncertain. The cumulative effect of this uncertainty is that
Cannabusinesses must continue to operate cash-only and assume the risks. 52

48

Sessions Memo, supra note 47.
Adam R. Scott, The Governing Dynamics of State Marijuana Legislation: Game Theory and the Need for
Interstate Cooperation, 124 Penn St. L. Rev. 769, 788 (2020).
50 Aaron Klein, Banking Regulations Create Mess for Marijuana Industry, Banks, and Law Enforcement, Brookings
Institution (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/banking-regulations-create-mess-for-marijuanaindustry-banks-and-law-enforcement/.
51 See, e.g. Kate Briquelet, Escaped California Inmate Cut Off Pot Dealer's Penis, The Daily Beast (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/escaped-california -inmate-cut-off-pot-dealers-penis. (Kidnappers robbed and
abducted the owner of a legal dispensary in California, cutting off his penis when he refused to reveal the location of
the cash used to run his business).
52 Richard P. Ormond, Cannabis, Cash, and Crime Banking, Lending, and Insolvency Restrictions Relegate the
Legitimate Cannabis Industry in California to an All-Cash Business, Vulnerable to Crime, L.A. Law., July/August
2018, at 22, 23 (2018).
49
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Like bars, jewelry stores, and convenience stores, Cannabusinesses are “high-risk”
businesses that hold highly valuable products and a lot of cash, which may tempt criminals or
promote crime.53 The risk and prevalence of crime against Cannabusiness, however, is incredibly
difficult to quantify. There is little data on the prevalence of robberies and burglaries at
Cannabusinesses, and many are dubious.54 What is not in dispute is that Cannabusinesses and
their owners are at high risk of such crimes as a direct result of their cash-only status and large
stores of valuable inventory.55 Storing cash on location is “like placing a giant target on your
storefront” and storing large amounts of money on site creates a safety risk for those in and
around those locations.56 These businesses, their clientele, and states seeking valuable tax
revenue will continue to suffer from these risks so long as banks are dissuaded from transacting
with Cannabusinesses.
Operating cash-only places a target on the backs of cannabusinesses and their owners. It
is common knowledge that those organizations rarely transact with banking institutions, meaning
the flow of currency in or out of the business must be in cash. 57 Forcing cannabusiness operators
to risk losing thousands of dollars and their lives by placing that target on their backs dissuades
prospective owners from opening businesses. Less business development means fewer
alternatives to the black market, which defeats the purpose of legalizing cannabis.

53

Tony Gallo, Cannabis, Communities, and Crime: Recent Statistics for Lingering Fears, Hoban Law Group,
(October 11, 2019), https://hoban.la w/2019/10/cannabis-communities-crime-stats/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
54 One in Two Cannabis Dispensaries is Robbed or Burglarized? Perhaps Not… RegTech Consulting LLC, (July
23, 2019), https://regtechconsulting.net/cannabis-marijuana/one-in-two-cannabis-dispensaries-is-robbed-orburglarized-perhaps-not/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
55 Id. at ¶ 18.
56 Anh Hatzopolous, The Cost Of Cash For Unbanked Cananbis Businesses, Forbes (Jul. 13, 2020, 8:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2020/07/13/the-cost-of-cash-for-unbanked-cannabisbusinesses/?sh=289790e7f4dd.
57 Id. (An estimated 70% of cannabusinesses operate cash-only. The decision to do so is often based on the
conception that cash-only is a cheaper or safer alternative to banking, but cash -only businesses incur many safety
and financial liabilities).
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Cannabusinesses Must Still Pay Taxes but are not Eligible for Deductions
As a general rule, income from any source is taxable by the federal government, even if it
is generated from illegal activity.58 Thus, like any business, Cannabusinesses must pay taxes.
Internal Revenue Code Section 280E (“Section 280E”) calls for companies within the cannabis
industry to report gross income from the sale of cannabis and cannabis products, less the cost of
goods sold as taxable income. Section 280E, therefore, requires Cannabusinesses to pay taxes on
their income without receiving any deductions because the goods sold include scheduled
controlled substances and ineligible for deductions. 59 Section 280E is not limited to necessary
business expenses ordinary to a Cannabusiness; it also disallows deductions related to the
business, including deductions for depreciation, charitable contributions, and state and local
taxes.60 Section 280E, therefore, has the effect of drastically increasing the effective tax rate of
Cannabusinesses and slashing their profit margins, often forcing Cannabusinesses to pay taxes
despite net negative cash flow.61
Section 280E creates a significant financial challenge for any would-be cannabusiness
startup: ensuring solvency while subject to an extraordinary federal tax relative to other
businesses. One such method for ensuring solvency is to solicit investors and obtain ample
startup capital. Soliciting investors is difficult, however, because the crushing tax bills which
result from disqualified business-expense deductions may, depending on how the business is

26 U.S.C. § 61(a); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961) (stating that “the net income of a taxable
person shall include gains, profits, and income from the transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or
profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever”).
59 26 U.S.C. § 280E (stating that no deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount incurred during the taxable
year in the course of business if such business consists of trafficking in controlled substances which is prohibited by
federal law or the law of any state in which that business is conducted).
60 Fed. Tax Coordinator ¶ L-2632 (2d.), Disallowance of Expenses of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs; Trafficking in
Marijuana; Cost of Goods Sold; Failed Constitutional Arguments.
61 Massachusetts Cannabis Law Manual, Chapter 5, Business and Taxation of Cannabis, 1 st Edition 2019.
58
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organized, flow through to the investors and require them to cover any deficiencies. 62 This risk
has great potential to chill investment in cannabusiness and dissuade investors from providing
much-needed startup capital to cannabis ventures, thus stifling the market. 63
In addition to the financial burden Section 280E places on prospective and current
Cannabusinesses, a second issue arises regarding the actual payment of income taxes: businesses
operating cash-only must pay their taxes in cash.64 Cannabusiness owners must travel to the
Internal Revenue Service and applicable state Department of Revenue to pay their taxes with
duffel bags full of cash.65 These trips present their own obvious risks: carrying large sums of
cash on-hand puts one at significant risk of being robbed, losing a significant portion of income,
or simply being unable to pay taxes on time if the offices are closed or unavailable (say, in the
event of a nation-wide quarantine).
Collecting cash payments from Cannabusinesses is similarly difficult for states in which
those businesses operate. In Oregon, for example, adult-use cannabis sales are centralized around
Portland, but the Oregon Department of Revenue is located in in Salem, roughly 50 miles
away.66 Washington adds an extra step to their tax collection process for Cannabusinesses:
retailers must make non-cash payments despite their limited access to banking services.67 If a
business cannot pay via a cash alternative, it may petition for a waiver which allows that

62

Jeremy Vaida, Tax Traps and Tips for Cannabusinesses, 50 MD. B. J., November/December 2017, 30, 33 (2017).
See, e.g., Hillary Bricken, Breaking News: Bye, Bye Cole Memo, Hello Uncertainty for Marijuana , Canna L.
Blog (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cannalawblog.com/breaking-news-bye-bye-cole-memo-hello-uncertainty-formarijuana/ (“Banks are incredibly conservative and taking down the Cole Memo will almost certainly lead some
banks to stop providing banking services to cannabis businesses”) (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
64 Mark Snider and Victoria K. Hanohano-Hong, Cannabis Law, High Taxes—Section 280E's Effect on Marijuana
Businesses, , Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur LLP, at 2 (April 2, 2021).
65 Mia Getlin, Cannabis Clients Lack Banking Options Amid Onerous Federal Requirements Navigating Today's
Wild West, Or. St. B. Bull., April 2019, at 34 (2019).
66 Justin E. Hobson, Please Take My Money—Taxing Cannabis, J. of Multistate Tax’n and Incentives, 1, 3 (August
27, 2017).
67 Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, Excise Tax Payment, https://lcb.wa.gov/marj/excise-tax-payment
(last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
63
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business to pay in cash for six months with a 10% fee, adding even more costs to an already
prohibitively expensive venture.68
The federal government and the states impose great barriers on Cannabusinesses and their
owners, which collectively render tax payment near impossible. These hurdles stem entirely from
cannabis’ status as a Schedule I controlled substance and the federal government’s decision to
dissuade financial institutions from doing business with Cannabusinesses. Such challenges could
be avoided by allowing Cannabusinesses to move away from a cash-only model and engage in
traditional banking practices.

Cannabusinesses Have Limited Access to Federal Courts
Another glaring issue caused by prohibition presents itself in the form of the “Unclean
Hands” doctrine. The “Unclean Hands” doctrine states that a contract that violates the law will
not be recognized as valid by the courts and neither party to the contract will be entitled to a
legal remedy in the event of breach, especially if public policy weighs against enforcement of the
contract.69
Some states have allowed for contractual remedies relating to the sale of cannabis. 70 On
the federal level, however, the “Unclean Hands” doctrine applies to all cannabis-related contracts
because they concern business dealings with federally illicit substances and state law cannot
guarantee protection to litigants engaging in those activities.71 Potential litigants, then, must pray

68

See Id.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (A promise or other term of an agreement
is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its
enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms).
70 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-601. Colorado codified into state law that a contract is not void or voidable as
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their remedies are limited to the purview of state courts wherein the “Unclean Hands” doctrine is
not used to void cannabusiness contracts, or risk their business dealings amounting to little more
than handshake agreements in the view of the federal courts.
The “Unclean Hands” doctrine is not limited restricting access to courts for contractual
remedies. Cannabusinesses also cannot file for bankruptcy because bankruptcy courts “wash
their hands clean” of Cannabusinesses.72 State law may apply in some instances, but bankruptcy
courts are federal courts because bankruptcy law is federal law.73 Cannabusinesses are, therefore,
left without remedy when faced with bankruptcy. 74
The inability to seek bankruptcy protection is especially harmful to Cannabusinesses
because, as explained earlier, Cannabusinesses incur extra expenses compared to non-cannabis
ventures. These expenses, especially when coupled with difficulties in procuring investment
capital, put Cannabusinesses at an increased risk of bankruptcy and, therefore, create an
increased need for bankruptcy protection. By precluding Cannabusinesses from accessing
bankruptcy remedies, federal policy generates undue hardship for those businesses, their
employees, and the businesses with which they transact.

IV. Suggestions for New Federal Cannabis Policy
A New “Cole Memo”
To lessen the considerable dissonance between federal and state cannabis law and policy,
federal departments could issue new memoranda like the Cole Memo and FinCEN Memo to

Steven Mare, He Who Comes into Court Must Not Come with Green Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing
Struggle with the Illegality and Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 H OFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1363 (2016).
73 Carlyon & Carlyon, supra note 71, at 42.
74 Vivian Cheng, Comment, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY B ANKR. DEV.
J. 105, 106 (2013)
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further guide cannabis enforcement and banking policy. Issuance of new memoranda could open
the door for better collaboration between the federal government and legalization states by
ensuring that the federal government would only enforce the CSA against those not acting in
compliance with state law. These memoranda must come from multiple sources, as guidance
from just FinCEN or the DOJ alone in inadequate to address the problems caused by existing
federal guidance.
The federal government and state governments are necessarily linked, and cooperation is
sensible for those entities to ensure the best possible outcomes. The Cole Memo outlined a
change in federal enforcement policy, encouraging federal actors to leave enforcement of statelegalized cannabis to the states unless an actor encroached upon one of “Eight Deadly Sins.”75
This policy shift allowed states to grow and police their respective cannabis industries without
unnecessary federal oversight and allowed federal prosecutors to focus their resources on more
serious enforcement matters.
New federal memoranda would similarly allow the states and federal government to
collaborate on cannabis enforcement. By loosening their hold on enforcement and explicitly
granting amnesty to financial institutions that choose to transact with Cannabusinesses, the
federal institutions could facilitate a more just landscape for Cannabusinesses. State-compliant
Cannabusinesses would no longer fear federal prosecution and banking institutions would be less
wary of dealing with those businesses. Allowing banks to provide services to Cannabusinesses
without significant federal retribution would give Cannabusinesses better access to capital,
options other operating cash-only, and the ability to pay taxes with electronic transfers. These
changes could lead to a more stable cannabusiness market, improved access to cannabis for
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recreational and medical users in legalization states, and, ultimately, more tax revenue for the
federal and state governments.
Issuing new federal memoranda is not without issues. Its biggest strength, that
memoranda can easily be altered and rescinded, is also its greatest weakness. There is no
permanence to federal memoranda and, like the Ogden and Cole Memos of years past, later
memoranda from unfriendly administrations could undo their guidance with ease. Such risk
means banks are unlikely to change their policy regarding transactions with Cannabusinesses
until more explicit legislation passes. To truly solve the cannabusiness banking issue, there must
be a more permanent solution in the form of federal legislation.
The SAFE Banking Act
The Secure and Fair Enforcement Banking Act of 2021, which was originally proposed in
2017 and passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on April 19, 2021, aims to eliminate the
cannabusiness banking issue.76 The SAFE Banking Act includes provides a safe harbor for
banking institutions that provide financial services to Cannabusinesses by prohibiting federal
banking regulators from taking adverse action against those such institutions. 77 The Act also
prohibits federal banking regulators from penalizing or discouraging financial institutions from
providing financial services to Cannabusinesses.78 In addition, the Act excludes proceeds from
legitimate cannabis-related ventures from the definition of “proceeds from an unlawful
activity.”79 The Act is currently pending in the United States Senate.
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The SAFE Banking Act includes multiple provisions that address the harms of federal
cannabis prohibition.80 While it does not deschedule or legalize cannabis, it specifically
addresses the financial symptoms of prohibition.81 By effectively granting amnesty to banking
institutions that transact with Cannabusinesses, cannabusiness owners could begin to move away
from a cash-only model without fear of repercussion or unavailable services. By excluding
legitimate cannabusiness proceeds from the definition of “proceeds from an unlawful activity,”
the “Unclean Hands” doctrine would no longer apply to Cannabusinesses, thereby allowing
easier access to federal courts. Finally, because the Act would become law unlike a DOJ memo
or executive order, it would be significantly more difficult to overturn than a unilateral executive
action.
The SAFE Banking Act is not without its drawbacks. While it reforms federal banking
law, the SAFE Banking Act does not legalize cannabis. Because it does not remove cannabis
from the federal schedule, the SAFE Banking Act continues federal prohibition and the
categorization of Cannabusinesses as criminal enterprise under federal law. 82 The SAFE Banking
Act also does not provide amnesty for state compliant Cannabusinesses other than no longer
considering their proceeds “from unlawful activity” solely because the transactions involve
Cannabusiness proceeds.83 The SAFE Banking Act only grants amnesty to financial institutions
that transact with those businesses and proceeds from those businesses, not the operations
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themselves.84 This deliberate omission leaves open the possibility of federal enforcement against
legitimate Cannabusinesses during later, more cannabis-averse administrations and fails to
protect those most vulnerable to cannabis prohibition: Cannabusinesses and their employees.
The SAFE Banking Act also fails to account for situations where a Cannabusiness
accidentally falls out of compliance with state law. In those instances, the banking institution
would no longer receive amnesty because the Cannabusiness is no longer a state-compliant actor.
This possibility introduces too much risk for financial institutions, which will likely choose to
avoid that risk until a more concrete regulatory landscape is established. As a result, the
symptoms treated by the SAFE Banking Act will continue to be a problem until cannabis is
federally legalized.

The STATES Act
The Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act (“STATES
Act”) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 4, 2019. If enacted, it would
amend the CSA to provide for a new rule limiting the application of the CSA as to cannabis.85
This Act adds language to Part G of the CSA thereby exempting its cannabis provisions as
applied to “any person acting in compliance with state law relating to manufacture, production,
possession, distribution, dispensation, or delivery” of cannabis. 86 The Act also includes
provisions regarding transportation safety offenses87 and distribution of cannabis to persons
under the age of twenty-one.88 The STATES Act has not seen any action in Congress since its
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referral to the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security on May 15,
2019.
If the STATES Act becomes law, the federal government must defer to state law
regarding cannabis enforcement.89 The Act, therefore, protects individuals and businesses
compliant with the applicable state’s cannabis policy.90 This deference will have similar effects
to the SAFE Banking Act by allowing banks to transact with Cannabusinesses without fear of
retaliation from the federal government and allow Cannabusinesses to then transition away from
the cash-only model.. Individuals and Cannabusinesses would be able to use and distribute
cannabis without fear of federal prosecution and would have easier access to the courts for
cannabis-related claims without fear of disqualification due to the “Unclean Hands” doctrine.
The biggest drawback of the STATES Act is that it does not deschedule cannabis. By not
descheduling cannabis, it only takes a half-step toward legalization. Conditioning federal nonenforcement on Cannabusinesses remaining compliant with the very letter of state law means
federal enforcement remains a viable threat. If a Cannabusiness violates even a minor and
obscure aspect of state law unintentionally, it exposes itself to federal prosecution under the
STATES Act. For example, if a cultivator owns a license to grow 1,000 plants but accidentally
owns 1,001 plants, the cultivator is no longer in compliance with state law. The state may deem
this a minor, fineable offense but federal law would punish cultivation of over 1,000 cannabis
plants criminally and could do so consistent with the STATES Act.91

Id. at § 2(a) (amending Section 710 of the CSA to read: “(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
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The potential for criminal prosecution also includes the possibility that banking
institutions will continue to refuse to transact with Cannabusinesses.92 If there is any risk that
financial institutions will be subject to criminal penalties for dealing with Cannabusinesses, there
is a likelihood that they will avoid, or at least heavily scrutinize, dealing with those businesses.
This leaves open the possibility that, despite the goals of the STATES Act, Cannabusinesses will
be left without viable banking options. The only way to ensure banks will transact with
Cannabusinesses and that Cannabusinesses will not be subject to federal penalties is to
deschedule cannabis at the federal level.
The MORE Act
The Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act (“MORE Act”) was
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on May 28, 2021, which passed the legislation
on April 1, 2022.93 The Act removes cannabis from the list of federally scheduled controlled
substances and eliminates federal criminal penalties for individuals who manufacture, distribute,
or possess cannabis.94 The MORE Act also directs the Bureau of Labor Statistics to compile,
maintain, and make public data on Cannabusinesses, their owners, and their employees.95 In
addition, it creates an opportunity trust fund and sets forth a plan for federal taxation of cannabis
for the purposes of aiding individuals adversely impacted by the war on drugs.96
The MORE Act is the most comprehensive of the three pending federal cannabis reform
bills. By removing cannabis from the CSA schedule, the MORE Act repeals federal prohibition.
The Act’s focus on demographic research and creation of an opportunity trust fund ensures
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greater long-term support for Cannabusinesses and the public than the STATES Act or SAFE
Banking Act. By putting the repeal of federal prohibition first, the MORE Act directly targets the
source of the problem and avoids the pitfalls common to the other bills; that is, treat the
symptoms rather than the underlying disease.
The biggest drawback of the MORE Act is its limited prescriptive capacity. The MORE
Act does not create a federal regulatory scheme for cannabis or provide any roadmap for federal
regulation. It also fails to explicitly address any banking concerns. While descheduling cannabis
would solve numerous cannabusiness banking issues, the Act does address SAR requirements
nor clarify federal penalties for Cannabusinesses which fall out of compliance with state law. It
also does not address any of the “Eight Deadly Sins” from the Cole Memo other than a small
point about distribution to minors.97 The MORE Act also does not speak to whether cannabis
regulation will be left entirely up to the states, or the federal government will continue to play a
role. These omissions would rend the regulatory landscape uncertain.

V. My Recommendation Moving Forward
To ensure effective regulation, Congress must repeal federal prohibition . The three
pending federal bills addressed earlier are deficient insofar as they leave in place numerous
cannabis-related legal issues. The STATES Act and SAFE Banking Act do not end the federal
cannabis prohibition and therefore do not take adequate steps to encourage banking institutions
to do businesses with cannabis ventures because they do not guarantee federal protection for
Cannabusinesses. The MORE Act is deficient because it does not address the banking issue at all
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and fails to account for the current regulatory landscape. While a good start, the MORE Act,
addresses the problem by removing the federal schedule in hopes that the finer details will be
worked out by the states and that there will be no regulatory vacuum. These are all incomplete
solutions.
The ideal solution would be for the federal government to enact the MORE Act with
several amendments. Those include guaranteed amnesty for banking institutions and a better
framework for federal-state cooperation. This revised bill would remove reporting requirements
for suspicious activity and only require banking institutions to report egregious violations via
SARs. Descheduling cannabis would resolve many of the underlying issues presented to
Cannabusinesses: the taxation and banking issues stem from cannabis’ classification as a
scheduled controlled substance.
A revised version of the MORE Act also ought to specifically address each of the “Eight
Deadly Sins” not resolved by legalization. Preventing use of cannabis on federal lands, for
example, is a moot point if cannabis is federally legal. This act should address age restrictions
similarly to the legal drinking age. Because the federal government cannot compel state action,
Congress must use its commerce power to influence state policy on the matter.98 If Congress
conditions disbursement of highway funding on a state’s limitation of cannabis sales to
individuals who are at least twenty-one, the “distribution to minors” concern would be resolved .
A revised MORE Act should also create a new Federal Bureau of Cannabis (“FBC”) to
promulgate a federal regulatory scheme or, in the alternative, delegate the creation of such a
scheme to another federal regulatory body. The newly formed FBC should have the authority to
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regulate and set standards for cannabis and cannabusinesses nationwide. The FBC must decide
how to police the actual product and set standards for purity, potency, quantity per package, and
safety. These regulations should be pursued similarly to how the FDA currently regulates
vaccines and other biologics. For example, the FDA has authority to immediately suspend a
biological product’s license; set additional standards for certain product types; and test individual
lots before manufacturers can distribute them. 99 Additionally, the FDA does not license any
biologic absent clinical studies showing the product is safe, potent, and pure “in one or more
appropriate conditions of use for which the reference product is licensed and intended to be used
and for which licensure is sought for the biological product.”100 The agency tasked with
regulating cannabis should adopt a similar “safe, potent, and pure” standard for all cannabis
produced, marketed, and sold in the United States and apply that standard across the country.
An alternative, less optimal solution would be to pass the MORE Act as is and address
the outstanding issues discussed above in subsequent legislation. The MORE Act has significant
momentum in Congress. It has already passed the House and its fate in the Senate remains to be
seen.
If the MORE Act is enacted, many of the root problems created by federal prohibition
will be resolved. Banks should be less wary of dealing with Cannabusinesses and
Cannabusinesses will no longer be disqualified from business expense deductions on their taxes.
At some point, however, Congress will have to address the lack of federal cannabis industry
standards or risk a chaotic and uncertain regulatory landscape with vast regulatory differences
from state-to-state. Cannabusinesses will have trouble sourcing product across state lines because
trafficking laws will remain in place in states which choose to continue prohibition. The federal
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government should ensure protection for those businesses which operate across state lines by
establishing federal standards as soon as possible.
VI. Conclusion
To further the social justice goals of state-level cannabis legalization, the federal
government must prioritize reforms that facilitating the safe and economic operation of
Cannabusinesses. The best way to ensure Cannabusinesses have a future is to federally legalize
cannabis and establish a strong regulatory framework. This will remove the harms to
Cannabusinesses caused by their lack of access to banking services, which force
Cannabusinesses to operate cash-only. A strong federal regulatory framework would also
establish a unified national standard for the states in establishing their own markets and licensing
Cannabusinesses.
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